Democracies end when they are too democratic.
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.
Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another.
Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it.
Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted.
In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices.
Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.
The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.
These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.In a must-read essay, former GOP congressional analyst Mike Lofgren analyzes America's "Deep State," in which elected and unelected figures collude to serve powerful vested interests.
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union was the first constitution of the United States. It was drafted by the Second Continental Congress from mid through late , and ratification by all 13 states was completed by early And if anyone can figure out decent ways for a Robin-Hanson-ian em-clan to put together a similar sort of internal legal system for its members, and can describe how cultural-evolutionary pressures would lead em-clans to tend towards any particular systemic details, I would love to read about it.
The Failed Amendments. See also: Emory University's Page. Article 1 of the original Bill of Rights This amendment, proposed in , dealt with the number of persons represented by each member of the House, and the number of members of the arteensevilla.com essentially said that once the House hit members, it should not go below , and .
Mar 28, · Fourteenth Amendment Essay; Fourteenth Amendment Essay. Mapp v. Ohio Fourth Amendment Case Essay This book is about all of our rights as citizens of the United States of America and cases that prove as to why these rights are so important to us.
and Fifteenth Amendments of The United States Constitution were . The Federalist No. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Independent Journal.